

THE PROBLEM OF PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE

by

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B. S., Kansas State College of Agriculture
and Applied Science, 1933

A THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

KANSAS STATE COLLEGE
OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE

1933

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PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis is to determine some of the major problems connected with the study of Philippine independence and attempt to draw some conclusions as to the merits of retention or complete separation of the archipelago from its present relations to the United States.

For the greater part of the research material used in connection with this study the writer is indebted to the Kansas State College, Manhattan, and the Iowa State University, Iowa City, Iowa.

The writer is very greatly indebted to Dr. Fred A. Shannon for the helpful suggestions and aid in all phases of the work of this thesis, for the general direction of the work, and the valuable criticisms in the preparation of this thesis.

I THE ACQUISITION AND EARLY YEARS OF AMERICAN RULE

American interest in the Far East began almost with the founding of the United States as an independent nation. On February 22, 1784, the first commercial contact with China was inaugurated when the Empress of China sailed from New York to Canton, returning in May of the following year. Other voyages soon followed and trade relations were established which have continued to become of greater importance. These ventures were aided by special acts of congress and the growing significance of the whaling industry in the Pacific. For a number of years the United States seems to have been content to follow Great Britain and other European countries by claiming the same treatment for her commerce as those nations were forcing China to grant them. This course was rather abruptly changed by the naval adventure of Commodore Matthew C. Perry in forcing Japan to negotiate a treaty opening two of her ports to American vessels in 1854. This agreement was followed by more favorable terms granted by Japan in 1857 and 1858. However, the real opportunity to gain a base for this expanding trade with the Orient and at the same time satisfy those people who believed in an imperialistic course came as a result of Dewey's defeat of the Spanish fleet at Manila during the

Spanish-American War. Public opinion would not permit the government to take part in the dismemberment of China or gain a foothold on the mainland of Asia. The acquisition of the Philippines was therefore looked upon by American expansionists as the golden opportunity for the advent of the United States into the field of colonial imperialism in the Pacific. The possession of Guam and the annexation of Hawaii were further steps in this direction which could logically have been expected to follow. It is quite evident from these events that by the beginning of the twentieth century America had embarked upon a course, the success of which depended largely upon naval control of the Pacific.

The Spanish war was entirely successful from the American military and naval standpoints. Spain began negotiations for an armistice late in July, 1898, through Jules Cambon, the French ambassador at Washington. The agreement to cease hostilities was signed August 12, 1898. When the peace commissioners met at Paris October 1, 1898, they were confronted with the post-armistice capture of the city of Manila, which had been occupied by General Wesley Merritt the day after the signing of the protocol but before the news had reached him. The American delegates refused to accede to the demand for the restoration of the status quo of August 12, but accepted the fact that the islands were not conquered and were therefore subject to negotiation. The

treaty was finally signed December 10, 1898, with the provision that Spain would cede the Philippines to the United States but that she should receive \$20,000,000 for her cash outlay in the islands.

President William McKinley submitted the treaty to the Senate January 4, 1899. A debate at once began which lasted until February 6, with the principal opposition coming from Senator George F. Hoar, a Republican from Massachusetts, over the acquisition of these islands. He introduced a resolution in the Senate January 14, 1899, proclaiming the Philippines free from all allegiance to the Spanish crown and that the United States should not interfere with the right of the Filipinos to establish a government of their own.¹ Again on February 6, he proposed a resolution declaring it was not the intention of the American government to make citizens of the inhabitants of the islands, to permanently annex them, or to force a government upon them against their will.² It appears to have taken some shrewd political maneuvering on the part of Marcus A. Hanna and other politicians in order to get the necessary two-thirds vote required for ratification by the Senate. Senator Arthur P. Gorman observed that: "It was an outrage the way Hanna and his friends are working the treaty through the

¹ Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., Vol. 32, p. 567.

² Ibid., p. 1493.

Senate. Some of the things they are doing transcend the bounds of decency." He said the railroad interests were being used through Stephen B. Elkins to force the treaty past the Senate. Senator Samuel D. McEnery of Louisiana was brought into line by being allowed to name a federal judge. The selection of postmasters won over Senator John L. McLaurin of South Carolina. It was impossible to get the necessary number of votes until William J. Bryan came to Washington and called some Democratic senators into a back room in the Senate chamber and urged them to support the treaty. Bryan believed that the status of the Philippines could best be settled by the election of 1900, but that it was first necessary to approve the treaty and end the war.³

McKinley's true attitude toward retention of the islands is hard to ascertain because of the inconsistency of his statements. In his first annual message to congress on December 6, 1897, in speaking of intervention in Cuba he said: "I speak not of forcible annexation, for that by our code of morality would be criminal aggression."⁴ But in his message to General Elwell S. Otis on December 21, 1898, he described the aim of the United States in the Philippines as one of "benevolent assimilation."⁵ Considering the re-

³ Arthur W. Dunn, From Harrison to Harding (New York, 1922), p. 282.

⁴ James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington, 1899), Vol. 10, p. 131.

⁵ Ibid., p. 221.

fusal of the American peace commission at Paris to restore the islands to Spain and the military overthrow of the republic set up by Emilio Aguinaldo, how could he have regarded occupation of the archipelago as anything other than "forcible annexation"? Probably the real reason for McKinley's decision is still unrevealed. The excuse most often given was the fear of both the United States and Great Britain that Germany would occupy the islands if the United States were to surrender them, and that this would likely bring on a world conflict. Other frequent explanations are the desire for trade expansion and to offset the encroachment of Germany and Russia in China.

When Bryan accepted the Democratic nomination in 1900, he made a speech entitled "Imperialism," which he regarded as one of his best. Regardless of the fact that it was only by votes from his own party that the treaty annexing the Philippine Islands was ratified, he made antiimperialism the leading issue of the campaign. He spoke ardently for Philippine independence and protection for the Filipinos while they worked out their own destinies. These pronouncements were in accord with the Democratic national platform of that year.⁶ No doubt the candidate had a great deal to do with the framing of the articles embodied in this document.

⁶ Kirk H. Porter, National Party Platforms (New York, 1924), p. 212.

The Republican platform proclaimed that there was no other possible course than to destroy Spanish power in the archipelago. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, in his trade expansion argument before the convention, explained his stand on the retention of the islands in these words: "We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested in the Philippines solely on account of others.... We believe in trade expansion."⁷ The stands taken by the two parties in 1900 have been pretty generally maintained since that time.

The first Philippine commission, named by McKinley in 1899, was presided over by Jacob Gould Schurman of Cornell University. It was sent out to investigate and report on conditions in the islands. In its recommendations, which favored independence, the commission even went so far as to argue that the worst form of government by Filipinos themselves was preferable to control of the natives by Americans.⁸

The period of insular control from 1901 until 1913 is often referred to as the Taft regime, for directly or indirectly he had an important part in the determination of all Philippine questions during those years. In April, 1900, William H. Taft was made president of a second commission.

⁷ John H. Blount, "Philippine Independence. When?," in North American Review, Vol. 184 (January 18, 1907), p. 372.

⁸ Francis B. Harrison, The Corner-Stone of Philippine Independence (New York, 1922), p. 55.

In July, 1901, he was appointed first civil governor after over a year of experience in the islands. In 1904 he was recalled and made secretary of war, but, since their government is left to the War Department, he was still in touch with the situation. From 1909 to 1913 he was still in control as President of the United States. Because of Taft's wide experience with all phases of affairs in the Philippines it is safe to assert that he was undoubtedly the best informed American on the subject at that time.

It is quite evident from what he told a Senate committee in February, 1902, that he did not at first approve of annexation. Among other things he said: "I think intervention by the United States in the Philippine Islands is the best possible thing that could have happened to the Filipino people... but for the people of the United States it probably would have been better that chance had not thrown the Filipino people under our guidance and protection."⁹ When asked, why at first he opposed acquisition of the islands, he replied: "I am not an expansionist, and I would much prefer that we should proceed in the United States to make government better here than to go to distant possessions."¹⁰

Taft's early acts seem to have met the approval of the

⁹ Senate Document No. 130, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 23, p. 406.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 406.

natives. He inaugurated a policy of keeping the "Philippines for Filipinos." He arranged for the bringing over of a thousand American school teachers and negotiated for the purchase of the Friar lands which had been a source of trouble for the Spanish and were to a large extent responsible for the revolts against Spain. He made it possible for the Filipinos to buy these holdings on easy payments and thus did much to settle the agrarian problem, which had been for many years a source of irritation.¹¹ Apparently he hoped by liberal treatment to win the people over to American rule.

The continued Filipino clamoring for freedom offended Taft, causing him to change his attitude to one less friendly toward them. This fact is shown by his answer to the question of whether the United States could justly hold the Filipinos against their will. He rather vaguely replied that they might be ready for independence "in some generations."¹²

Many of the officers and discharged soldiers in the islands opposed Taft's early generous treatment of the natives. On many occasions differences in views arose which had to be settled by Secretary of State Elihu Root or McKinley himself. The military men, having conquered the in-

¹¹ Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 44.

habitants, resented the fact that people other than themselves were allowed to take control of the government. Many of these men took up business and remained in the islands and became wealthy while others sank to the level of beachcombers. To show their displeasure for the loss of prestige they composed short theme songs about the Filipinos and the man they held responsible for their loss. An example of these songs is, "He may be a brother of William H. Taft but he ain't no brother of mine."¹³

Independence has been an issue both in the islands and in the United States ever since the annexation. Three major attempts were made in that direction before the inauguration of President Woodrow Wilson. The first was in 1910, when the Philippine assembly passed a resolution asking congress for freedom as early as practicable and immediately if possible.¹⁴ The second was a presentation of a request for immediate self-government to congress by Manuel L. Quezon. He asked that the United States use its good offices to bring about an agreement among the great powers for the neutralization of the archipelago.¹⁵ The third came in the American House of Representatives after the Democrats took control of that body following the election of 1910. This resulted in a report, in 1912, from the committee on insu-

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹⁴ Frederick C. Chamberlain, The Philippine Problem (Boston, 1913), p. 197.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

lar affairs recommending qualified independence in eight years and complete separation in 1921.¹⁶

The general effect of agitation in early years was to produce an almost universal desire for freedom among the natives. American residents there showed nearly unanimous opposition. In the United States opinion was divided even within the political parties as to what course was the best to pursue. In the main the Republicans tried to justify their part in the acquisition and retention of the Philippines as well as their method of governing them. On the other hand the Democratic platforms never failed to condemn their opponents for what they claimed was unwarranted imperialism.

II THE PERIOD OF RAPID PROGRESS IN SELF GOVERNMENT

The Democratic platform of 1912 merely confirmed the stand taken on the Philippine question in the three preceding presidential elections. In all of them the Republican experiment in imperialism was condemned as an inexcusable blunder bringing to the United States only expense and national weakness because of the acquisition and retention of these distant islands. The Democrats stood for an imme-

¹⁶ Maximo M. Kalaw, "Philippine Independence Movement," in Current History Magazine, Vol. 10 (July, 1919), p. 127.

diately declaration favoring independence as soon as a stable government could be established, freedom and territorial integrity to be guaranteed by the United States until neutralization treaties could be entered into with other countries. They asked for retention of necessary naval bases and coaling stations. They pointed out the relation of the United States to Cuba as an example of the principle they wished to follow in the Philippine Islands.¹ The Republican platform simply maintained that the problem of colonial government was a national obligation to be kept free from partisan politics.²

The Filipinos felt that with the election of Wilson and a Democratic congress the policy of the United States would be changed to one more in keeping with their wishes. This fact is indicated by the hilarious celebrating and parading which took place in Manila during a rainstorm when the news of the election reached that city.³

One of Wilson's first acts was the appointment of Francis Burton Harrison as Governor General of the Philippine Islands, a position which he held during the entire eight years Wilson remained in the White House. Harrison says that his appointment was requested by Quezon, who succeeded

¹ Porter, National Party Platforms, p. 284.

² Ibid., p. 359.

³ Harrison, The Corner-Stone of Philippine Independence, p. 49.

in getting the support of William A. Jones, a representative from Virginia and chairman of the committee on insular affairs. Mr. Jones was successful in getting Bryan interested in Harrison and the president sent his name to the Senate.⁴ After this, Quezon personally conducted him to the islands and for several months was his confidential advisor.⁵

All of Harrison's predecessors, with the exception of Taft, had administrative experience in the Philippines before taking over control.⁶ Wilson being as much a novice as the governor general and most of the latter's associates having never been confronted with colonial administration, it should have been easy to predict sweeping changes in the government of the islands. Since there were no ingrained prejudices to be overcome, that is exactly what did take place. The new policy inaugurated with the name of Harrison is described as "bending every energy to prepare for independence."⁷

Harrison proved to be the most liberal governor the natives have ever had. He believed experience was the best teacher in training people to rule themselves. With this idea in mind, he proceeded to give the people far greater

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁵ Daniel R. Williams, "General Wood and the Filipinos," in *World's Work*, Vol. 47 (February, 1924), p. 366.

⁶ Henry L. Stimson, "Future Philippine Policy under the Jones Act," in *Foreign Affairs Magazine*, Vol. 5 (April, 1927), p. 462.

⁷ "Future of the Philippines and Our Part in It," in *Current Opinion*, Vol. 35 (October, 1913), p. 227.

powers than they had previously enjoyed. Abuses came from this rapid increase in autonomy, but Harrison's theory was that in a democratic state abuses are self corrective and that even if they were more frequent the results would doubtless be more permanent.⁸ Such methods of governing the islands were in accord with Wilson's views. This is plainly indicated by the presidential message to the Filipinos delivered by Harrison upon his arrival at Manila October 6, 1913. The following extract contains the essence of the policy. "Every step we take will be with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands and in preparation for that independence. And we hope to move toward that end as rapidly as the permanent interests of the islands will permit. After each step taken experience will guide us to the next."⁹

The first move taken by Wilson to give the people a greater voice in their government was to appoint a majority of Filipinos to the commission, which is the upper house of the Philippine legislature. This decision on the part of the president broke the deadlock then existing in that body and gave the natives control of both houses. Previous to 1913 this appointive body had been composed of five Ameri-

⁸ Maximo M. Kalaw, "Governor General Stimson in the Philippines," in Foreign Affairs Magazine, Vol. 7 (April, 1929), p. 372.

⁹ Harrison, op. cit., p. 50.

cans and four Filipinos. The real cause of the deadlock, as Harrison sees it, was a fight for control of the purse strings of the government.¹⁰ A short time after they were appointed the new members cabled their thanks to the chief executive saying they accepted the offices in order "to aid in the work of laying down the basis for a stable free Filipino government."¹¹ In his message of December 2, 1914, Wilson told congress his policy in the islands was to continue to give the people more and more self government and modify any steps taken as the successes or failures tended to show modification was necessary. He said: "By their council and experience rather than our own we shall learn best how to serve them and how soon it will be wise or possible to withdraw our supervision."¹²

Mr. Taft attacked the new method of governing the Filipinos. He especially condemned the discharge of experienced Americans and their replacement by untried men for what he claimed to be partisan advantage.¹³ To these charges Harrison replied, that he only brought over six appointees and only four of these could be considered political office holders. He then pointed out that five of these six were

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹³ "Mr. Taft, Mr. Harrison, and the Philippine Question," in The Outlook, Vol. 111 (December 8, 1915), p. 877.

soon driven out of the service because of the hostility and bitterness of Americans in Manila.¹⁴ Harrison also told his critics that in the ten years before his appointment an average of 646 Americans each year had either voluntarily or involuntarily left the classified civil service and that in the first year after his arrival the number was only 716, but, that these positions were filled with Filipinos and not with men brought over for that purpose.¹⁵ Harrison contrasted this with the Republican method. He gives figures showing that in 1913 there were about 9,000 members in the classified group and that 2,600 of the higher offices were filled with Americans. This, he points out, was a greater number of Americans than in either 1907 or 1908. This fact was very much resented by the natives.¹⁶ Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison charged Taft with blind partisanship in his criticism of the Democratic administration of affairs in the islands.¹⁷

In 1914, a bill passed the House of Representatives providing for Philippine independence as soon as a stable government could be established. This bill was crowded out of the Senate calendar and so failed to become a law.¹⁸

¹⁴ Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

¹⁷ "Mr. Taft, Mr. Garrison, and the Philippine Question," *loc. cit.*, p. 823.

¹⁸ Kalaw, "Philippine Independence Movement," in Current History Magazine, Vol. 10, p. 127.

The House action on this "Jones bill" was accepted by the Filipinos with delight. At a joint session of their legislature a resolution was unanimously adopted expressing their highest appreciation and satisfaction and earnestly requesting the president and Senate to approve the bill. The governor general was requested to transmit the resolution by cable to the United States government.¹⁹

On February 3, 1916, the Senate adopted an amendment to the Jones bill which had been introduced and sponsored by Senator James P. Clarke of Arkansas. Opinion was evenly divided upon this proposed change and it was accepted by the Senate only with the support of three Republican Senators, William S. Kenyon, Porter J. McCumber, and Robert M. La Follette. Even then it took the deciding vote of Vice President Thomas R. Marshall to break the tie.²⁰ The important change which this made in the Jones bill was that it promised the Filipinos complete independence two years after its approval.²¹ Wilson supported the amendment after it had passed the Senate. Secretary Garrison believed that it was too radical and this was one of the principal causes of his resignation. Having been approved by the Senate, it went to the House where it was turned down by a vote of 213

¹⁹ House Document No. 1350, 63rd Cong., 3rd Sess., Vol. 103, pp. 1-2.

²⁰ Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 53, p. 1998.

²¹ Ibid., p. 846.

to 165 with not a single Republican voting for it and thirty Tammany Democrats voting against.²² The reason for its defeat according to Governor General Harrison was that: "About twenty-eight Democrats bolted the party leadership and voted with the majority of the Republicans against independence; these bolting members were virtually all members of the Roman Catholic faith, and it is understood that their attitude was the result of the intervention of Cardinal Gibbons of Baltimore, acting, it is supposed, at the instigation of the ecclesiastical authorities in the Philippines."²³ The reason for this was that much church property had been destroyed in previous revolutions, but that the church had prospered under American protection and wished it to continue. Mr. Quezon showed his resentment of the action of the New York Democrats by a speech at the following St. Patrick's Day banquet at Manila in which, referring to Irish politics, he said: "We wish you Irishmen the same independence you wished for us."²⁴

The House repassed the Jones bill, without the Clarke amendment and in the Senate six western Republicans, William H. Borah of Idaho, Moses E. Clapp of Minnesota, William S. Kenyon of Iowa, Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin,

²² "Filipino Independence Put Off," in Literary Digest, Vol. 52 (May 13, 1916), p. 1357.

²³ Harrison, op. cit., p. 193.

²⁴ George M. Dutocher, The Political Awakening of the Far East (New York, c. 1925), p. 288.

George W. Norris of Nebraska, and John D. Works of California voted with the Democrats to pass it.²⁵ Its final passage on August 29, 1916, was largely due to many years of effort on the part of Representative William A. Jones of Virginia, chairman of the committee on insular affairs, and Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock of Nebraska, who was chairman of the like committee in the Senate.²⁶ After its passage Jones cabled Sergio Osmena, Speaker of the Philippine Assembly, to congratulate the Filipinos through their speaker upon the passage of the act, which he interpreted as practically giving them the power to determine when they would become an independent nation.²⁷

The preamble of the Jones act declares that: "It was never the intention of the people of the United States in the incipency of the War with Spain to make it a war of conquest or for territorial aggrandizement; and whereas it is as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein...;" In order to accomplish this it was desirable to give more of the governing over to the natives, but in the meantime none of

²⁵ "Democrats try to set a date for letting go of the Philippines," in Current Opinion, Vol. 60 (March, 1916), p. 156.

²⁶ Harrison, op. cit., p. 192.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 195.

the sovereignty of the United States was to be impaired.²⁸

The most uncertain part about Jones act is the clause making stability of government the prerequisite for independence. What is a stable government? Who is to determine when a government of that nature is established? The answer to the first of these questions can be phrased in such a manner as never to allow the Filipinos freedom or it might be construed so as to permit the islands to be set adrift at any time. The second points directly to the president and congress. As to stability of government, the Filipinos claimed to have already fulfilled that condition before the law was enacted. However, some Americans asserted that the provision implied ability to protect themselves against foreign aggression.²⁹ If this latter extreme view is accepted none of the smaller and even many of the larger countries do not have such a government.

The body of the Jones act contains three provisions which have caused frequent controversy. One of these deals with the veto power of the governor general, another with tariff control, and the third with control of public lands. Each of these questions will be discussed more in detail in later chapters.

Theodore Roosevelt saw in the passage of the Jones act the proof that the actions of the United States were extended

²⁸ Statutes at Large, Vol. 39, pt. 1, p. 545.

²⁹ "Independence and Self-Government," in The Independent Magazine, Vol. 81 (February 22, 1915), p. 205.

upon with only a fine high purpose in view. He reminded the nation that when America acts in such a manner as to lead the Filipinos to believe that some definite action is to result then that promise should be kept. He maintained that the islands are a source of weakness to the nation, that the Democratic administration made it difficult to hold them in case of war with a strong naval power, and that under these circumstances it would be best to give them early freedom without any guarantee of any kind or the retention of any foothold in the archipelago.³⁰

The platforms of the two major parties in 1916 differed materially on the question of an insular policy. The Democrats endorsed the provisions of the Jones act as proof that they had attempted to fulfill the pledges made in 1912. They also reiterated their promise to grant ultimate independence.³¹ The Republicans renewed allegiance to the principles proclaimed by McKinley and consistently carried forward by Roosevelt and Taft. They condemned the Democrats for what they alleged to be an attempt to abandon a responsibility, which the United States had accepted as a duty to civilization and the Filipino people; the shirking of a task which if left half done would mean that America had broken her pledges and injured her prestige.³² Warren G.

³⁰ Moorfield Story, *The Philippines an American Ireland*, in *Foreign Affairs Magazine*, Vol. 5 (June, 1927), p. 579.

³¹ Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 385.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 397.

Harding, chairman of the Republican national convention, on June 8, 1916, in referring to the defeat of the Clarke amendment called it an effort of the Democratic administration "to renounce its guardianship of a race of people and leave them to walk alone when they have not yet been taught how to creep." He followed this with the remark that: "A few rebellious Democrats joined the Republican minority in sparing us the national disgrace," and ended his remarks by making several denunciations of attempts to "haul down the flag."³³

A short time after Wilson's second inauguration the entry of the United States into the World War called the attention of congress and the president to questions far more pressing than Philippine independence. These problems seem to have pushed the fate of the islands into the background for a time. From the report of the governor general, it appears quite evident that most of the native leaders were of the opinion that the world conflict made further discussion of immediate freedom inexpedient at that time. These men desired that their claims should be allowed to rest until the end of the war, when it was hoped the United States would present their wishes for an independent existence to a congress of nations.³⁴

³³ Harrison, op. cit., p. 194.

³⁴ Senate Document No. 150, 65th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 6.

The Philippine legislature met in regular session in the autumn of 1917 and a resolution was promptly adopted setting forth "the unequivocal expression of loyalty of the people of these islands to the cause of the United States of America...." They gave as their reason for adopting this attitude that America had been forced to intervene in the war to defend universal democracy and uphold the rights of small nations against the threats of autocracy and imperialism. In reply to this vote of loyalty Wilson sent the following message: "Please convey to the Philippine Legislature, in warmest terms, my appreciation of its admirable resolutions...."³⁵

Soon after the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany a special session of the Philippine legislature was called by Mr. Quezon, President of the Senate. He secured passage of a militia bill giving the governor general power to introduce compulsory military training in the islands for every able-bodied citizen between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. Congress then passed an act providing for the federalizing of the militia, and the War Department made plans for the organization of the natives into a fighting unit. The natives later seem to have been quite willing to aid the United States

³⁵ Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

because, while only 15,000 had been asked for, over 25,000 offered their services and had enrolled by July 1, 1917. Their government offered to supply a full division of troops, to provide funds for one destroyer and one submarine for the navy, and the people made prompt responses to appeals for Red Cross funds and Liberty Loans.³⁶ Secretary of War Newton D. Baker said: "With fine self-restraint the Filipino people refrained from active discussion of the question [referring to independence]; deeming it inopportune at the time, and threw all their resources into the common scales with the people of the United States."³⁷ It is quite evident from the actions of the inhabitants and the testimony of those men who were directly in charge of relations with them that they were loyal to America during the war.

After the termination of the world conflict the Filipinos felt that brighter days were in store for them. The statements of the leaders of the allied and associated powers during the war as to the rights and liberties of small nationalities had been spread throughout the islands by newspapers and through statements of the council of national defense. The propaganda of that period seems to have instilled in the minds of the inhabitants a feeling

³⁶ Senate Document No. 130, 65th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 1.

³⁷ Kalaw, "Philippine Independence Movement," loc. cit., p. 128.

that races of people regardless of number were in the future to be secure in their right of self determination. They felt confident that the prompt formation of a league of nations would provide security for small self-governing nations. All of their political parties in the election held on June 3, 1919, had independence planks in their platforms.³⁸

During the world war the Philippine government entered upon several important business undertakings. A board of control was organized consisting of the governor general, president of the Senate and speaker of the House of Representatives to control these undertakings. The national companies organized were the Manila Railroad Company, The Philippine National Bank, the National Development Company, the National Coal Company, the National Iron Company, and the National Petroleum Company. All of these, with the exception of the iron and petroleum companies, began operations and showed deficits during their first six years of business. The causes which are held to be largely responsible for these losses were the condition of world affairs following the war, mismanagement, and lack of experience.³⁹

These enterprises were organized partly for the purpose

³⁸ "Report of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands for the year ending December 31, 1919," in the war Department Annual Report (1920), Vol. 3, pp. 3-5.

³⁹ Williams, loc. cit., p. 367.

of supplying needed financial assistance for the essential industries after an unsuccessful attempt had been made to get the necessary help in the United States. This failure was due to the need for unprecedented amounts of capital for use in America and Europe at that time. Another reason for these government projects was the fear that if they did not develop their own resources the islands would fall into the clutches of American "big business" as soon as American money was available for investment in the colonies.⁴⁰ If a condition of this kind developed they felt that it would make independence harder to get if not even impossible of attainment.

During the eight years of the Harrison administration a policy of filling the offices with Filipinos was carried on in a thorough fashion. The natives called his period of control the "New Era," meaning that it was the time when in all branches of their government rapid Filipinization was taking place. In 1913, approximately twenty-five per cent of the insular offices were filled with Americans. A short time after Harrison left the number of Americans had been reduced until they hardly numbered three per cent of the total.⁴¹ This shows how rapidly they had been filled by natives and illustrates the policy Wilson and Harrison fol-

⁴⁰ Dutcher, op. cit., p. 263.

⁴¹ Stephen P. Duggan, "Future of the Philippines," in Foreign Affairs Magazine, Vol. 5 (October, 1926), p. 118.

lowed in preparing the people of the islands for self government. It also contradicts Taft's statements about the discharge of experienced employees to replace them by others for partisan advantage. The percentage of Americans in office stated above is further substantiated by the statistics submitted by Governor General Leonard Wood in his annual report for the year ending December 31, 1925. His figures are nearly identical to those previously given by Harrison.⁴² It is true that this report was made almost four years after he first took office, but, since he was always adverse to the appointment of Filipinos, it is reasonably safe to assert that he was not responsible for the increase in the number of native office holders.

Any student of history would naturally expect that the liberal methods of governing the islands would be discussed in political speeches, and this proved to be the case. The Republicans claimed that Harrison had ruined American prestige, hurt the administration, and brought economic distress and financial chaos to the inhabitants. On the other hand, the Democrats were quick to assert that he had simply performed his duty imposed on him by the Jones act and carried out the solemn promises made by the government of the United States at the time of the treaty with Spain.

The Democratic administration appears to have been con-

⁴² House Document No. 571, 69th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 5.

vinced that the Filipinos had fulfilled the provision laid down in the Jones act as the prerequisites for independence. This is shown by the views of various leaders, who were in charge of insular affairs. President Wilson in his annual message to congress in December, 1920, said: "Allow me to call your attention to the fact that the people of the Philippines Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government since the last action of congress in their behalf and have thus fulfilled the condition set down by congress as precedent to consideration of granting independence to the islands. I respectfully submit that this condition has been fulfilled, it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the people of those islands by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet."⁴³ Congress now controlled by Republicans, did not act on his suggestion but left that question over until Warren G. Harding became president. Secretary Baker told the Philippine Mission in 1919 that he and the president felt the time had substantially come when the islands could be allowed to become an independent nation.⁴⁴ Harrison said in his annual report in 1920 that the Filipinos now have a stable government.⁴⁵ With the expiration of Wilson's second term there came an end to the period of unusually liberal administra-

⁴³ House Document No. 267, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess., p.2.

⁴⁴ "Filipinos think their time for Probation is ended," in *Current Opinion*, Vol. 66 (May, 1919), p. 277.

⁴⁵ House Document No. 267, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess., p.1.

tion of government in the islands. Probably more progress was made toward self government during those eight years than has ever been made in any similar period of time in any country with a climate comparable to that of the Philippine Islands.

III THE PERIOD OF RETRENCHMENT IN PHILIPPINE SELF GOVERNMENT

Soon after Harding became president, the Philippine Legislature sent a parliamentary mission to the United States asking the chief executive to use his influence to secure the approval of congress in carrying out the independence request Wilson had laid before that body. In his reply to this petition Harding assured them that their only differences of opinion on that subject were in relation to the time when self government should be granted. He told them he did not believe the time had yet arrived for a final decision.¹

Harding appointed a commission, with Leonard Wood and W. Cameron Forbes as its leaders, to go to the islands and study the situation. Judging from the past unfavorable attitude of military men, it must have been evident to Filipino political leaders that the report would be unfavorable to the early withdrawal of American supervision. The report

¹ Charles C. Hatchelder, "Philippine Independence," in Foreign Affairs Magazine, Vol. 2 (March, 1924), p. 496.

was given to the president on October 8, 1921, and was, as many people had predicted, unfavorable to immediate freedom. It stated that the experience of the past eight years had not been such as to justify the United States in taking a step which would very likely leave the islands a prey to other powerful nations. It was alleged that the abandonment of the Philippine Islands at that time would be a betrayal of their people and a discreditable neglect of a national duty. They recommended that the president nullify the acts of the insular legislature diminishing the authority of the governor general as defined by the Jones act. Also they proposed that the president should be authorized to make a final decision in case of a deadlock between the governor general and the Philippine Senate over confirmation of appointments. The financial condition of the government was depicted almost hopeless.²

A New York firm of certified public accountants found the Philippine National Bank in a deplorable state on account of being operated "in violation of every principle which prudence, intelligence, or even honesty dictate."³ This was in accord with the account given by the commission.

² "Report of the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands," in House Document No. 325, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 1-47.

³ Williams, "General Wood and the Filipinos," in the World's Work, Vol. 47, p. 368.

Neither of these statements mentions the fact that chaos resulting from the aftermath of the World War had affected adversely some of the oldest established European and American business houses and banks in the Far East. The justice of such criticism may well be questioned when it is remembered that approximately one-third of the banks in the United States in 1920 has closed their doors by 1933. Wood saw to it that the men who had committed criminal offenses in connection with the bank were punished. The president with several other leading officers as well as various subordinates were convicted of embezzlement and other criminal offenses. One of them, the manager of the Aparri branch, avoided prosecution by confession of guilt followed by suicide.⁴

Thomas Harrington, British council general at Manila, reported in 1924 that the Philippine Islands were making satisfactory financial recovery. Their bonded debt had been increased from \$35,038,800 to approximately \$76,112,060 by the end of 1924 to protect the gold standard fund and other government interests.⁵

The methods used by Wood were disliked by many Filipinos but they proved effective in promoting financial recovery. Yet, similar readjustments were taking place in the

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ "The Philippine Islands; Period of Recovery," in Far East Review, Vol. 22 (June, 1926), p. 263.

United States as well as in other parts of the Far East. Wood had a horror for industries built up with government support which he often referred to as "state socialism." No doubt this accounts for his abolition by executive decree of the board of insular control as well as its prior opposition to him.⁶

The policies used by Wood were decidedly different from those of his predecessor. He surrounded himself with a military cabinet, the members of which he claimed were responsible to him and not to the legislature. Such a reactionary change following Harrison's liberalism was certain to bring repercussions. A deadlock soon came about between the executive and the legislature. The native members of the council of state resigned and a policy of noncooperation with the American officials was pursued.⁷

The immediate occasion for the break between the two branches of government was Wood's reinstatement of an American, Ray Conley, as chief of the secret service. The real cause was the two different interpretations placed upon one of the provisions of the Jones act which reads as follows:

The Philippine Legislature may thereafter by appropriate legislation increase the number or abolish any of the executive departments, or make such changes in the duties thereof as it may see fit, and shall provide for appointment

⁶ "General Wood Plays Mussolini," in The Nation, Vol. 123 (December 1, 1926), p. 551.

⁷ Kalaw, "Governor General Stimson in the Philippines," in Foreign Affairs Magazine, Vol. 7, p. 373.

and removal of heads of executive departments by the Governor General: Provided, that all executive functions of the government must be directly under the Governor General or within one of the executive departments under supervision of the Governor General.⁸

It was the avowed purpose of Quezon to reduce the governor general to a mere figurehead,⁹ while Wood desired to exercise the full powers given him in the Jones act.

On January 8, 1924, a second mission from the islands presented petitions to President Calvin Coolidge and congress. In these they accused Wood of ignoring the assurances given by Harding that no backward steps would be taken in the development of self government. He was charged with having a secret cabinet of military advisors, abusing the veto power, destroying the budget, and ruling in a military and reactionary fashion. In conclusion, they asked that independence be granted.¹⁰

Coolidge was unlike Harding in that he seemed always to make the Wood policies his own. In reply to the petition of the second Philippine mission complaining of the regime he maintained that the governor general had acted only within his constitutional authority and that the

⁸ Lutoher, The Political Awakening of the Far East, pp. 293-294.

⁹ "Filipino Independence Campaign," in Literary Digest, Vol. 78 (September 29, 1923), p. 21.

¹⁰ "Extracts from the Philippine Mission to the United States," in Congressional Digest, Vol. 3 (April, 1924), p. 231.

United States government was determined to sustain him. He further claimed that the lack of cooperation between executive and legislature was proof that the Filipinos were unfit for self government.¹¹ No doubt the contention of the president that Wood had remained within the limits of his constitutional authority was strictly correct. It was the uncompromising way in which he used these powers which caused the troubles.

The Republicans in their platform in 1924 simply promised independence whenever it was evident to the government of the United States that it was best for Philippine welfare, but such a time had not yet arrived.¹² The Democrats endorsed the stand taken by Wilson in his last annual message to congress when he asserted that a stable government had been established and asked them to grant the Filipinos their freedom.¹³

Wood in his annual report for the year ending December 31, 1925, contended that the number of Americans in the government service had been reduced to the minimum. Any further reduction he reported would not permit the effective discharge of the obligations and responsibilities of sovereignty. These statistics are given to support his contention.¹⁴

¹¹ House Document No. 571, 69th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 30-33.

¹² Dutcher, op. cit., p. 296.

¹³ Porter, National Party Platforms, p. 489.

¹⁴ House Document No. 325, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 5.

"Legislature wholly Filipino.
 Six secretaries or heads of executive departments 5 Filipinos and 1 American.
 Nine justices of the supreme court 4 Filipinos 5 Americans.
 Attorney General and Solicitor General both Filipinos.
 All prosecuting attorneys Filipinos.
 Fifty-five auxiliary judges 53 Filipinos 2 Americans.
 Forty-eight governors of provinces 45 Filipinos 3 Americans.
 All justices of the peace except on military reservations Filipinos.
 Twenty-eight bureau chiefs 24 Filipinos 4 Americans.
 Bureau of customs 99.5 per cent Filipinos.
 Teachers 98.5 per cent Filipinos.
 All treasury department officials Filipinos."

In spite of this large degree of native control aside from the governor's council, Queson was not satisfied with the state of affairs. In a speech before the upper house of the legislature he said that he preferred "a government run like hell by Filipinos to one run like heaven by strangers."¹⁵

The next decided step in the direction of independence came with the introduction of a bill into congress by Representative Louis W. Fairfield of Indiana. It authorized a new Filipino made constitution, a native governor general, a United States commissioner to be appointed by and represent the president of the United States, American retention of the control of foreign affairs, supremacy of the United States Supreme Court over all of the insular courts, and rec-

¹⁵ Williams, "General Wood and the Filipinos," in the World's Work, Vol. 47, p. 370.

ognition of complete separation twenty years after the inauguration of such a government. This bill failed to pass, but by 1925 many Filipino political leaders and some Americans were contemplating plans for a future dominion status similar to that of Canada or Australia in the British Empire. Three of the colonial leaders, Quezon, Osmena, and Manuel Roxas, expressed their opinion to a congressional committee that such an act would be acceptable to their constituents. The opposition to a measure of this nature came from an unexpected source. It was headed by General Emilio Aguinaldo, hero of the Philippine Insurrection. He had remained out of politics for over twenty years but his popularity was still great and his avowed hostility to an act of this kind spelled doom for it so far as acceptance by the inhabitants of the islands was concerned. His antagonism was based upon the clause which fixed twenty years as the time to elapse before independence was recognized by the United States. He advocated that this be changed to four years.¹⁶ Apparently he wished to see an independent nation during his life time.

In answer to the continued complaints about the wood administration, Coolidge decided to send a commission to the islands to investigate and make a report on conditions

¹⁶ Norbert Lyons, "Philippine Leaders' Split on Independence Issue," in Current History Magazine, Vol. 21 (March, 1925), pp. 866-872.

there. He chose Carmi A. Thompson to head the delegation. Thompson was a member of the "Ohio Gang" which had brought so much discredit to the Harding administration from 1921 to 1923. It was generally assumed from his early statements that the findings of the delegation would favor the inauguration of a governmental policy designed to help American commercial interests. It was expected that the rubber companies in the United States would receive a great deal of consideration in any recommendations which would be made. If those people in charge of American commercial concerns hoped to benefit from this investigation they must have been sadly disappointed, for the report proved to be very honest and straightforward.¹⁷

Coolidge sent the Thompson report to congress on December 22, 1926. In presenting it, he made it known that he did not agree with all of Thompson's views, but failed to indicate the points of his disapproval.¹⁸ It was assumed that he referred to those which criticized the Wood administration. The commission made several important recommendations. Briefly they may be summed up as follows: Settlement of political problems by providing civil advisors for the governor general, creation of a colonial office to look after

¹⁷"Carmi Thompson Investigation and Report," in The New Statesman, Vol. 23 (January, 1927), p. 429.

¹⁸Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 68, p. 912.

On August 14, 1926, Wood vetoed a Philippine bill calling for a plebiscite on the independence question, giving the following reasons: (1) Such action is not within the power granted the legislature by the Organic act. (2) Initiative in the matter rests with the United States Government. (3) The bill permits the people to vote only on whether they want immediate and complete separation or not; no provision being made for an opportunity to express themselves on any degree of self government. (4) Fairness of results in such an election is unlikely as the conduct of voting would necessarily be in the hands of those who have publicly declared in favor of abolition of the existing bonds of union. (5) Emotional appeals based on racial and national feeling are likely to outweigh calm judgment in an election of this kind. (6) The conclusions drawn by the Wood-Forbes Commission, the judgment of Harding, and the conviction of Coolidge are all indications that the islands should not be freed at the present. (7) The question of the legality of congress to withdraw sovereignty over territory once acquired has been raised in that body.²²

The legislature easily overrode Wood's veto, but Coolidge rejected the bill when it was sent to him, virtually repeating the wood excuses. He concluded his veto message

²² House Document No. 325, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 68-75.

with these words: "In frankness and with utmost friendliness, I must state my sincere conviction that the people of the Philippine Islands have not yet attained the capability of self government."²³

Wood died in 1927 and, during the nine months interregnum before the arrival of his successor, Henry L. Stimson, Vice Governor Eugene A. Gilmore acted as governor general. During this time he succeeded with very little difficulty in bringing back cooperation between the executive and legislative branches of the government. In doing this he retained the executive power taken over by Wood.²⁴ In breaking the deadlock between these two branches of government, he certainly should be given credit for making the task of Stimson much easier. The manner in which this was brought about seems to substantiate the conclusion reached by the Carmi Thompson Commission, that Wood should have been removed and replaced with a man more willing to cooperate. Here as elsewhere in the history of colonial government it was demonstrated that whenever a man is sent out to govern a colony and cannot secure the cooperation of his subjects, the wise thing to do is to replace him with a man more in accord with the wishes of the inhabitants so that legislation can be passed for the benefit of the people. This

²³ "Fatherly Veto of Filipino Hopes," in Literary Digest, Vol. 93 (April 23, 1927), p. 8.

²⁴ H. Ford Wilkins, "Gilmore and the Filipinos," in Review of Reviews, Vol. 80 (December, 1929), p. 164.

Coolidge refused to do and the friction between the legislature and the governor general caused unnecessary ill feeling toward the United States. Apparently from the results of the short time Gilmore was in charge, it is safe to assert that if Wood had displayed a little more tact and used military methods less, better results could have been expected.

In August, 1928, the Legislature passed and Stimson approved a bill giving technical advisors and civilian assistants to the governor general. Here again, one of the recommendations of the Thompson Commission was finally put into effect. Another of Stimson's acts which made for harmony in government was the creation by executive order of an advisory council of state consisting of the governor general, the president of the Senate, the speaker of the House, the majority floor leaders of the Senate and House, and the six heads of executive departments. Stimson was neither as liberal as Harrison nor as reactionary as Wood. He had no such difficulties as Wood had with the legislature.⁸⁵ The reason for this was that sympathetic treatment proved more conducive to harmony than arbitrary rule.

Stimson did not believe that either permanent ownership or immediate separation should be resorted to by the

⁸⁵ Zalaw, "Governor General Stimson in the Philippines," loc. cit., p. 383.

United States. He felt that what was needed most was a consistent policy in dealing with these distant possessions. He saw the good will and loyalty of the "self-governing dominions of Great Britain" as the ideal position the United States should try to attain in the Philippine Islands. If this plan should be followed, he argued that as the natives become better trained in self government they should have a Filipino governor general and that the only American official necessary to keep in the islands would be a resident commissioner.²⁶ He actually proposed the formation of a Philippine Commonwealth, under an American governor general, as a solution of their future relations to the United States. Dwight F. Davis, Secretary of War, invited the president of the Philippine Senate, Quezon, and majority floor leader of the Senate, Osmena, to come to Washington for a discussion of this question. Quezon gave his hearty support to the proposition. "In fact," he said, "such a solution would permanently end the cry for independence and would solve all the outstanding problems between the United States and the Philippines."²⁷ Here again is evidence that a dominion status would be acceptable to Quezon and some of the leaders in the American Government.

²⁶ Stimson, "Future of the Philippine Islands under the Jones Act," in Foreign Affairs Magazine, Vol. 5, pp. 459-471.

²⁷ "The Future of the Philippines," in Far East Review, Vol. 23 (October, 1927), p. 436.

In 1929 Stimson gave up his post in the islands to take up the duties of Secretary of State in the cabinet of Herbert C. Hoover, Dwight F. Davis being appointed as his successor.²⁸ There was little if any change in the administration of government as a result of this change.

In 1930, the appointment of Nicholas Roosevelt as vice governor proved to be a decided mistake on the part of Hoover. Roosevelt had written a book entitled The Philippines a Treasure and a Problem, in which he plainly stated that the Filipinos are an inferior people in whom the benevolent education for self government has bred a contempt for America and Americans. Such a characterization of the people hurt the pride of this sensitive race and resulted in a violent outburst of indignation when it was made known that he had been named as their second highest government official. A copy of the book was thrown into the sea and another was burned at the stake before a large crowd. A business man of that city publicly challenged the author to a duel. After such an unfavorable demonstration, the appointee withdrew his acceptance and after a reconsideration Hoover accepted it and appointed him minister to Hungary, thus closing the incident.²⁹

²⁸ "The New Governor General of the Philippines," in Current History Magazine, Vol. 30 (July, 1929), p. 605.

²⁹ Wilkins, "Dwight F. Davis: Governor General of the Philippines," in Current History Magazine, Vol. 34 (June, 1931), p. 361.

Davis while still secretary of war declared that the methods of dealing with the Filipinos in the past had been unsuccessful. He said:

There can be no doubt in the light of past events--and there appears to have been no doubt in advance of the event--that the effort to develop in the Philippines a people capable of self government has, to an extent, interfered with the economic development of the islands. Necessarily there has been a stressing of political capacity of the people, at the expense of the development of productive activity.³⁰

Many rumors were heard during 1931 that Davis intended to resign as governor general. These were, however, always denied.³¹ On November 21, 1931, he left on an indefinite leave of absence, presumably because of the illness of Mrs. Davis then in Paris. This left Vice Governor George C. Butte as acting governor general.³² The year 1931 had been a trying one. Several outbreaks occurred, resulting from a mixture of nationalistic, communistic, and economic causes.³³

Late in the year of 1931 Davis asked to be relieved of his duties, and Hoover appointed Theodore Roosevelt III as his successor. The new governor general took the oath of office in Manila February 29, 1932. In his speech delivered on this occasion he insisted that it was his duty to

³⁰ George B. Rex, "Daylight in the Philippines," in Far East Review, Vol. 24 (January, 1928), pp. 8-9.

³¹ Wilkins, loc. cit., p. 352.

³² "The Philippine Problem," in Current History Magazine, Vol. 35 (January, 1932), p. 583.

³³ "Annual Report of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands," in House Document No. 355, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 13.

aid the small land owners.³⁴ It is early yet to announce accurately the results of the Roosevelt regime. If he does aid the small land owners he will be striking at the root of the difficulty which seems to have been causing the greatest amount of trouble before his arrival.

The Republican national platform of 1932 did not mention Philippine independence.³⁵ The Democratic platform gave only four words to this subject but they were to the point. It simply said that the party advocates "independence for the Philippines."³⁶

From 1930 on there has been a period of notable progress for the Philippine Independence movement. The Hawes-Cutting Bill was introduced into the Senate by Harry S. Hawes of Missouri on March 5, 1930.³⁷ Complete freedom was offered after a period of five years of advanced autonomous government, providing the natives in a vote on that question at the end of the indicated time still showed that they favored setting up a government of their own.³⁸ There was considerable opposition to this proposal. The majority report of the committee to whom it was referred was favorable but the minority was strongly opposed to it. Senator Hiram Bingham as leader of the opposition stated that an act of

³⁴ "Launch a New Church," in Christian Century, Vol. 49 (May 4, 1932), p. 586.

³⁵ Platform Adopted by Republican Convention of 1932, in a pamphlet put out by the convention, p. 2.

³⁶ Platform Adopted by Democratic Convention of 1932, in a pamphlet put out by the convention, p. 5.

³⁷ Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 72, p. 9833.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 4794-4796.

this kind was "tantamount to a proposition for immediate independence."³⁹ Secretaries Stimson and Hurley spoke against it in hearings before a Senate committee.⁴⁰ The bill was finally sidetracked and so failed to pass the Senate at that time.

In June and July, 1931, Hawes visited the Philippine Islands to investigate conditions and get acquainted with the desires of the inhabitants. The occasion of his arrival was chosen as an opportune time for an independence parade. This was designed to impress upon the sponsor of the Senate bill the overwhelming desire of the natives. Thousands of citizens of Manila and the surrounding country took part in this enthusiastic demonstration which was certain to leave a vivid impression on the mind of a man interested in their welfare.⁴¹

On April 5, 1932, the House of Representatives voted to pass a bill introduced by Butler B. Hare, a Democrat from South Carolina. This provides for the granting of complete separation eight years after enactment. It would authorize the framing and adoption of a constitution, by the inhabitants of the islands to be used when complete separation became an established fact. It would provide a limit in

³⁹ Senate Document No. 781, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 1-6.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 2, 5.

⁴¹ "Hawes Uproar in the Philippines," in Literary Digest, Vol. 110 (July 25, 1931), p. 10.

the free importation of Philippine duty free sugar, restrict immigration, and reserve for the United States the privilege of maintaining naval bases in the islands.⁴²

In the present session of congress, the Senate on December 17, 1932, voted to pass the Hawes-Cutting bill. As passed by the Senate it provides for freedom after twelve years, but limits duty free exports to America to a limit below the House bill besides excluding immigration to the United States entirely. Quezon declared the present status is far better than the proposed terms, while many other Filipino legislators asserted that its provisions are outrageous, unjust, and tyrannical. Representatives from Negros, the sugar province, said the Senate limitation on sugar exports would ruin the sugar industry. The two bills then went to the conference committee. The conference report set ten years as the period of time after enactment before separation is complete. During this period duty free sugar importations are limited to 850,000 long tons, coconut oil at 200,000 tons, cordage at 5,000,000 tons, and the immigration quota is set at fifty per year.⁴³ The report was adopted by the Senate on December 22, 1932,⁴⁴ and on

⁴² "Philippine Independence Movement in the Recent Congress," in Congressional Digest, Vol. 11 (May, 1932), pp. 153-154.

⁴³ New York Times, December 19, 1932, p. 8.

⁴⁴ Ibid., December 23, 1932.

December 29 the House approved it.⁴⁵ It was then sent to the president.

On January 13, 1933, Hoover vetoed the Philippine bill and sent it back to the House. The excuses given for vetoing it may be summed up as follows:⁴⁶ (1) The islands are economically dependent on favored trade with the United States. (2) The time for transition is too short to allow proper readjustments in their finances. (3) It provides no immediate relief for American agriculture. (4) The United States is left in a position of responsibility for maintaining order with no effective means of doing so. (5) The Filipinos would lack the necessary revenue to maintain a stable government. (6) The bill would do untold harm to the islands and place them in "grave danger of foreign invasion and war." The House immediately voted to pass the bill over the president's veto by a vote of 274 to 94.⁴⁷ It then went to the Senate where it was passed on January 17, 1933, by a vote of 66 to 26. At last after being in possession of the United States for thirty-four years congress has voted to put the issue of independence up to the Filipinos themselves.⁴⁸ Now it becomes a matter of acceptance or rejection by the Philippine legislature of the act designed to create

⁴⁵ Ibid., December 30, 1932.

⁴⁶ Kansas City Star, January 13, 1933.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid., January 17, 1933.

"The Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands."

IV INDEPENDENCE AND THE COMMERCIAL TIES
TO THE UNITED STATES

One of the strongest motives for taking over the Philippine Islands was trade expansion. The United States was looking decidedly to the future in selecting a naval station and a base for commercial undertakings in an area in which rapid development of trade was expected.

There are four distinct events in the tariff history of the United States which have profoundly influenced trade relations with these insular possessions. On March 8, 1902, congress imposed a duty on Philippine goods of three-fourths the rates of the Dingley tariff act.¹ In 1909, the law was modified so that all Philippine products were allowed to enter duty free, with the exception of tobacco and sugar. At the same time duties were placed on many articles entering the archipelago.² On February 26, 1906, congress had placed a one hundred per cent duty on their imports of cheap foreign textiles and a heavy tax on boots and shoes, while American coast wide shipping laws, which excluded foreign vessels from participation, were extended to include these islands.³ At the same time, congress re-

¹ Statutes at Large of the United States of America, Vol. 57, p. 84.

² Idem., Vol. 36, pp. 176-177.

³ Idem., Vol. 34, pp. 24-27.

fused to allow Philippine sugar and tobacco to enter the United States under a duty of one-fourth of the Dingley rates. These provisions seem inconsistent, but they were adopted to assist American cotton manufacturers, shipping, tobacco, and sugar interests.⁴ The matter was greatly simplified when all restrictions on the importation of their goods were removed in 1913.⁵

Manila has one of the finest harbors in the Orient and serves as a distributing point for American trade in that section of the world.⁶ Is it any wonder that the commercial interests are opposed to Philippine independence? There is no nation outside of Asia itself more concerned over the development of this area than the United States. The primary reason for this is that, with the exception of Russia, America's Pacific coast is nearer to it than it is to any of the maritime nations of Europe. Because the rivers of eastern Asia flow eastward there is an added assurance that the trade will always be in that direction.

The Jones act of 1916 gives the Philippine government power to enact tariff laws levying duties on foreign goods entering the islands, but their trade relations with the United States are governed exclusively by acts of congress.

⁴ Blount, "Philippine Independence. When?" in North American Review, Vol. 184, p. 149.

⁵ Stewarts at Large, Vol. 38, pt. 1, p. 192.

⁶ Dutcher, "The Political Awakening of the Far East," p. 92.

It further provides that no laws passed by the insular legislature amending the tariff or affecting immigration and currency laws shall go into effect without the approval of the president of the United States, unless he has not disapproved them within six months of their passage, in which case they shall become laws as if they had been approved.⁷ This plainly indicates that congress intended that their trade should be governed by rules and regulations acceptable to the United States.

It would seem, with commercial interests so eager to develop trade with the Far East, that large amounts of American capital would have been invested in the islands. There are several reasons which have made this impracticable. The Organic act of 1902 fixes a limit of approximately 2,500 acres as the maximum amount of public land which can be owned or leased by one individual. This was originally claimed to be for the purpose of preventing the public lands from being exploited. The fact that American interests in Cuba and the beet-sugar producers in the United States were clamoring for protection against cheaper Philippine sugar gives weight to the assertion that they were the sponsors of that section of the act.⁸ The possession

⁷ Statutes at Large, Vol. 39, pt. 1, p. 548.

⁸ See, "Daylight in the Philippines," in Far East Review, Vol. 24, p. 8.

of 2,500 acres is not sufficient to induce capitalists to invest in sugar growing in the archipelago. Operations could only be carried out on a scale so small that they would not be profitable. It was probably hoped that this would make the development of a Philippine sugar industry unlikely and prevent competition on the American market.

The Jones act also gave the legislature power to control public lands, except when lumber and mining privileges were granted. In making grants for these lands it was required that the president of the United States give his approval.⁹ They have done nothing since that time which would allow a greater amount of land to be held.¹⁰ Quezon in these words gives the reason why Filipinos oppose American investments: "It is likely to postpone indefinitely the day of National Independence."¹¹ Apparently this is why they were anxious to build up home industries with government aid.

The lack of capital has meant the retardation of development. Since their occupation these islands have absorbed about \$200,000,000 of capital while Cuba has American and British investments of approximately \$1,200,000,000.¹² One

⁹ Statutes at Large, Vol. 39, pt. 1, p. 547.

¹⁰ Rea, loc. cit., p. 8.

¹¹ Walter Hobb, "Filipinos' Demand for Independence," in Current History Magazine, Vol. 19 (November, 1923), p. 283.

¹² Frederick M. Davenport, "Philippine Independence," in The Outlook, Vol. 147 (September 14, 1927), p. 53.

of the chief causes for the failure to attract capital is the uncertainty of the future status of the islands. Business men are always cautious and like to know before investing whether there is likely to be any change in the existing government.

A great expansion in the sugar industry came after the United States permitted Philippine sugar to come in free. This gave them a decided advantage over foreign producers on the American market. Raw sugar, under the Underwood tariff act, was forced to pay a duty of 1.85 cents per pound except Cuban sugar which was given the special rate of 1 cent per pound.¹³ Under the Fordney-McCumber act these rates were raised to 2.206 and 1.7648 cents, respectively.¹⁴ Then they were increased to 2.5 and 2 cents per pound by the Hawley-Smoot tariff of 1930.¹⁵ Under these conditions it can be seen that Philippine sugar is able to command a relatively high price on the American market. Another reason for this rapid expansion of their sugar industry is that the price of sugar was abnormally high during the World War. During this period a change was made from muscovoda to centrifugal mills. This entailed large expenditures and when the depression of 1921 came on the only way to avert enormous losses was to increase production so that the mills

¹³ Frank W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (7th ed., New York, c. 1923), p. 457.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 427.

¹⁵ "Hawley-Smoot Tariff," in Current History Magazine, Vol. 32 (August, 1930), p. 979.

could grind up to capacity.¹⁶ The following table is given by Arnold H. Warren, an accountant and sugar chemist, to show the relative cost of producing sugar in the various countries.¹⁷

	Cost of Cane	Mfg. Cost	Mkt'g Expense	Total
Cuban factory	0.91	1.13	.234	2.274
Javan factory	1.15	1.581		2.731
Philippine factory	1.97	1.57	.56	3.2
Philippine planter	2.045	1.673	.56	4.278

It is obvious, from these statistics, that Philippine sugar cannot hope to compete with other producing countries in the American market, if the present free trade privileges are discontinued.

The next table will give some idea of the extent to which the Philippine sugar trade with the United States has grown in comparison with that of Cuba.¹⁸ (See page 57.)

¹⁶ Arnold H. Warren, "Is the Philippine Sugar Producer Building His House on Sand?" in Far East Review, Vol. 20 (October, 1924), p. 470.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 472.

¹⁸ United States Department of Commerce Year Book, 1931, pp. 128, 174.

Average:	Cuba Lbs.	Cuba Dollars	P. I. Lbs.	P. I. Dollars
1910-14	3,856,000,000	91,686,000	232,340,000	5,827,000
1923	6,499,000,000	157,079,000	1,150,031,000	46,973,000
1929	8,297,000,000	157,601,000	1,421,456,000	49,692,000
1930	5,290,000,000	75,823,000	1,587,457,000	51,398,000

From a study of these tables it is apparent that under the protection of the American tariff an industry has been built up on an economic foundation which is entirely dependent on a United States market. This can only be interpreted as a grave economic mistake, for, if independence is ultimately granted, it will mean competition for this newly established industry and it is obvious that free competition spells destruction.

A move was started early in 1923 for the separation of the Mohammedan tribes (Moros) from the Christian Filipinos. This move received its impetus from the American rubber companies who succeeded in getting an agitation started in congress for an act of this nature.¹⁹ There are three conflicting views as to what should be the relationship of the island of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago to the rest of the group. These two regions are settled largely by Moros and constitute the richest undeveloped region under the stars and stripes. They have been found to be among the finest regions in the world for the growing of rubber. Soon after this fact became known American business men, especially those interested in rubber companies, discovered that the Christian inhabitants of other parts of the islands

¹⁹ "Rubber Interests," in the New Statesman, Vol. 26 (January, 1927), p. 439.

could never be trusted to get along with their Mohammedan brothers under the same government. They insisted that these two regions should be separated from the rest of the archipelago. There is one element in the islands consisting of both Christians and Moros who oppose such separation. They realize that these are the richest provinces and that separation would prevent them from ever attaining unity and national strength. Another group, made up almost entirely of Moros, wish all foreigners and native Christians to stay away from them, because they fear that their small population will be absorbed.³⁰ The significant thing about the separation agitation was that it came at about the same time that the British rubber monopoly was becoming alarmingly significant in the world market. The excited discussion over this proposed separation could hardly do other than confirm the belief of the natives that the influence of American big business, if permitted to gain a firm foothold, would retard the granting of independence. This feeling is at least in part responsible for their slow economic development.

While Stimson was governor general, he was continually stressing the necessity of encouraging the entry of Ameri-

³⁰ Halston Hayden, "What Next for the Moros?", in Foreign Affairs Magazine, Vol. 6 (July, 1928), p. 633.

can capital in order to promote the building up of industry. He indicated that he believed industries such as telegraph and telephone communication would be handled with greater efficiency by private companies than under government control.²¹

The following table is given with the intention of showing the effects of American ownership and tariff policy upon the flow of their imports and exports.²² (See page 61.)

This table shows the average yearly importation of American goods for 1926 to 1930 to have been over eighteen times the average between the years 1901 and 1905. During the same period the average yearly imports from all other countries has increased only approximately 1.63 times. In considering exports from the same standpoint, it is found that their exports to the United States have multiplied by over ten times those of the previous years, while their exports to all others have scarcely doubled. This plainly indicates that free-trade privileges have tended to shape the greater part of their trade like a funnel leading to the United States. From the same table it will be found that their balance of trade with America in 1930 was \$27,-159,033. In the same year they had an adverse balance with other countries of \$17,084,859. This leaves a favorable net

²¹ Randall Gould, "Stimson Shows His Hand," in The Nation, Vol. 127 (October, 1928), p. 463.

²² Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1931, p. 617.

Imports and Exports in Dollars			
	Imports from the U. S.	Imports from all other countries	Exports to the U. S. : all others
1901-05 average	4,245,949	27,652,100	10,179,525
1910	20,775,301	26,892,320	18,741,771
1915	22,394,361	22,086,480	23,001,275
1920	93,239,778	57,143,505	105,216,263
1925	69,897,593	50,435,251	109,044,942
1926	71,575,316	47,723,374	100,003,215
1927	71,478,297	44,373,176	111,738,289
1928	83,658,016	50,759,630	115,585,676
1929	92,592,959	54,567,316	124,465,473
1930	78,183,088	44,909,926	105,342,061

balance of \$10,074,174. The only conclusion which can be drawn is that they have a trade built on artificial arrangements not enjoyed by other nations. It is evident that intentionally or unintentionally there has been built up an economic structure which will make independence work a hardship on the inhabitants, at least until their economic life is modified to meet the changing conditions of a separate existence.

Americans in the islands point with pride to this trade as a reason why independence should not be granted. Commerce, they say, is likely to expand as the islands are developed. From all indications, it is the sugar industry which is likely to develop most rapidly. This is because of the subsidy, in the form of free trade, granted Philippine sugar when it enters the United States.²³ Is pride taken in such trade justified? In 1930 they sent 1,587,457,000 pounds of sugar to America.²⁴ Under the present rates imposed on foreign sugar of 2.5 cents per pound this means a subsidy of \$39,686,425. In other words, if the American exports to the archipelago ever reach \$396,686,425 including a profit of ten per cent, the profit would just equal the tariff subsidy granted their sugar. This explodes the fallacious contention that freedom should not be granted be-

²³ "Immediate Filipino Independence," in Far East Review, Vol. 20 (October, 1924), pp. 467-468.

²⁴ United States Department of Commerce Year Book, 1931, pp. 128, 174.

cause of trade benefits to the United States. Even before the higher tariff of 1930, their products in the year 1929 would have paid \$117,000,000 to enter the American markets, or over three times their favorable balance of trade for that year.²⁵

There are several advantages to the Filipinos in their present relation to the United States. They pay no American income tax. They have the protection of an army, navy, and diplomatic service which they do not have to support. They are protected by American Oriental exclusion laws but can themselves migrate freely to the United States. They have autonomy in framing tariffs against the products of foreign countries and at the same time have free access to the American market. Stimson asserts the Filipinos have a higher standard of living than other Oriental people, due largely to the trading privileges accorded them.²⁶ The loss of these privileges, which can be expected to come with independence, will cause Philippine goods to come into direct competition with the goods of China, Japan, and the Dutch East Indies.²⁷ However, if the Democrats lower many tariff rates as they have indicated they intend to do the

²⁵ "Annual Report of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands," in House Document No. 160, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2.

²⁶ Stimson, "Future Philippine Policy under the Jones Act," in Foreign Affairs Magazine, Vol. 5, pp. 463-464.

²⁷ Nicholas Roosevelt, "Philippine Independence and Peace in the Pacific," in Foreign Affairs Magazine, Vol. 8 (April, 1930), p. 413.

American market will not continue to give the same protection to Philippine goods it has in the past. Probably the best solution, in case it is decided to give them independence, is to apply the tariff gradually to Philippine goods. If it is gradually raised over a period of years, it will permit them to accustom themselves to the conditions under which they are to live. There can be no doubt that the American occupation has benefited the Filipinos in many ways. In freeing them, they should be given the best opportunity to form a government of their own under conditions which will impose the least hardship and permit the greatest chances of success.

The foundation of the Philippine economic structure is not a sound and solid one that can be expected to stand under natural conditions. If they are granted independence, their whole economic structure must be rebuilt from the bottom up.²⁸ It would have been much better to have allowed them to build up a nation, during the past thirty years, in which they could live and stand alone.

In 1929, the Timberlake bill was introduced into congress. It provided for a duty on all of the insular sugar in excess of 500,000 tons per year, and other duties on such products as coconut oil and copra. It would deprive

²⁸ George B. Nea, "Altruism versus Horse Sense in the Philippines," in Far East Review, Vol. 22 (October, 1926), pp. 449-450.

the Filipinos of the right to become American citizens and exclude them from the country by an immigration law. It failed to pass but stirred up a considerable amount of favorable comment over the entire country.²⁹ Stimson appeared before the House ways and means committee to oppose it and a delegation came over from the Philippines for that purpose. It was argued in opposition to this measure that it would stir up active agitation for independence and hurt American prestige in the Orient. It was claimed that these people bought goods made in the United States at higher prices than they would have to pay for the same goods in Japan, China, or Australia, therefore Americans should buy their goods. Still another argument advanced in opposition was that a closed American market would be a calamity impairing the living of every Filipino.³⁰ The latter argument is no doubt true and should always be considered whenever the welfare of these people is thought of because the American tariff system is responsible for it.

In America the sugar producers are asking for immediate and complete separation. The Cuban sugar interests are clamoring for it. These two groups are afraid that the rapidly increasing volume of Philippine sugar imported will destroy their own industry.³¹ An independence bill can al-

²⁹ Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 8325.

³⁰ "Future of the Philippine Islands," in The New Republic, Vol. 58 (May 1, 1928), p. 294.

³¹ "Sugar Patriots," in The world's work, Vol. 59 (May, 1930), pp. 18-19.

ways be counted on to have their support. On September 12, 1929, Senator William A. King of Utah introduced an amendment to the Hawley-Smoot tariff bill, sponsored by himself and Senator Edwin S. Broussard of Louisiana, the purpose of which was to grant immediate independence to the Philippines in order to prevent their sugar from competing with the home product.³² It is quite significant that both of these senators are from sugar producing states.

American dairy interests are interested in every act that brings separation for the islands nearer. They wish to see a duty placed on copra and coconut oil. Such products are now widely used as butter substitutes and come into direct competition with American dairy products. This is the reason the New York and Wisconsin dairy men ardently support every bill of this nature.³³ In 1920 Representative James C. Strong, a Republican from Kansas who has always opposed independence for the Philippines, took the floor in the House to announce that he was now in favor of bidding them good-bye and Godspeed.³⁴ The interesting part about this is that he is the owner of a large herd of Holstein cattle and no doubt voices the sentiment of dairy men throughout the country.

³² Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 3567-3568.

³³ "Philippine Minimum," in The New Republic, Vol. 67 (June 3, 1931), p. 59.

³⁴ "Freeing the Filipinos to Tax Them," in Literary Digest, Vol. 103 (December 3, 1929), p. 8.

The American Federation of Labor is in favor of separation or at least excluding Filipino immigrants. This feeling is especially strong among the laborers in the Pacific-coast states. The senators and representatives from those states form almost a solid bloc favoring complete separation. This feeling has been aggravated by recent anti-Filipino race riots. The large number of Filipinos in the western states has caused American laborers to fear the intrusion of these people more than the Japanese and Chinese.³⁵ Representative Richard J. Welch of California introduced a bill into congress in 1928 which would bar Filipinos from the United States.³⁶ Race riots and bills such as Welch introduced are not conducive to a good understanding between the people of the Philippine Islands and the United States.

Other interests favoring Philippine independence are widely scattered. Some of the most important of these are the tobacco growers, tobacco manufacturers, and producers of cottonseed oil and peanut oil. In almost every American industry which has to compete with insular products in the American market sentiment is found in favor of immediate and complete independence.³⁷ In addition to these groups, there

³⁵ Raymond L. Buell, "America's Stake in the Philippines," in Current History Magazine, Vol. 35 (March, 1932), p. 789.

³⁶ Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 9275.

³⁷ Raymond L. Buell, "Freedom for the Philippines," in The Forum, Vol. 80 (November, 1931), pp. 306-307.

are some congressmen who have no economic benefit in view but believe in it as a matter of principle.³⁸

In opposition to independence, we find groups of Americans including the shipping interests, American businessmen in the islands, and military men. The Catholic church opposes independence. The reason for this is that in the revolution of 1896 church lands were expropriated, Friars were driven out, and many churches and convents were destroyed. The church has prospered under American rule and wishes it to continue.³⁹

Manuel Roxas, Speaker of the Philippine Legislature, made a trip to the United States late in 1929 and discovered what he thought was a bright prospect for early independence. He returned to the islands and on November 5, 1930, launched a New Nationalistic movement known as the Ang Bangong Katipunan, the meaning of which is "to take the course we should werr we independent." Its purpose is to attain national unity, economic nationalism, racial equality, preservation of natural resources, foster national culture, national discipline, honest government, encourage some home industries, discourage others dependent on free trade with the United States, and promote idealism.⁴⁰

³⁸ Buell, "America's Stake in the Philippines," 100. cit., p. 789.

³⁹ Duggan, "Future Philippines," in Foreign Affairs Magazine, Vol. 5, p. 115.

⁴⁰ Andres V. Castillo, "New Nationalism in the Philippines," in The Nation, Vol. 133 (July 1, 1931), pp. 23-24.

It appears at the present time that it may be the commercial standpoint which will be the deciding factor in settling the fate of the Philippine Islands. The only element which does not look at separation in that light are those who regard independence as a moral principle. This group believe that we should keep the promises made to the Filipinos. Apparently the future status of the islands will be settled in congress from a standpoint of the benefits that are to be received from independence or retention. Those senators and representatives looking out for American agricultural interests, the American Federation of Labor, American sugar manufactures, Cuban sugar interests, and the others who look at independence from a moral point of view have lined up for Philippine independence. The opposition consists of those persons representing manufactures, selling goods to them, the church, military men, American business men in the Philippines, shipping interests, and those imperial minded folks who believe in "manifest destiny."

The prospect of a high tariff on insular goods entering the United States is causing many Filipinos to oppose complete separation. Many of the Philippine newspapers are turning against this extreme demand.⁴¹ As the chances for independence become brighter, they are looking more and more at the economic results of separation.

⁴¹ "Filipinos Have Another Thought," in Literary Digest, Vol. 109 (June 13, 1931), p. 9.

The fact that economic gain, rather than justice, should be the deciding factor in determining the future status of approximately 13,000,000 people is not a pleasant conclusion to arrive at, yet there is no way of disregarding that it is one of the most powerful factors at present and may prove the deciding one. Apparently the Americans and Filipinos look at independence from the standpoint of dollars and cents.

Y INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE

Events in the Far East in the decade preceding and the one following the occupation of the Philippines kept the world in a nervous frame of mind. A world conflict could easily have been started over a number of different changes that were taking place. Japan was rapidly coming to the front as a world power after her defeat of China and the annexation of Formosa. In this conflict she won a military victory but suffered a severe diplomatic set-back when Russia, supported by France and Germany, virtually threatened war in case she kept the Liao-tung Peninsula. A few years later Russia took possession of Port Arthur and extended her influence over the whole Liao-tung Peninsula. This act was the beginning of the enmity between Russia and Japan which finally resulted in the Russo-Japanese War and made Japan a

world power. Germany established herself on Kiao-shan Bay and received concessions from China in the Shantung Peninsula. Great Britain leased Wei-hai-wei for as long a period as Port Arthur should remain in the hands of Russia. This action on the part of Britain was taken as a measure of self defense for her possessions and trade in the Far East. Russia then built a railroad from Port Arthur to the trans-Siberian line running to Vladivostok and fortified Port Arthur. All of China, it seemed, was soon to be dismembered and the spoils divided among the European powers.

Under such conditions it is no wonder that most of the nations interested in the partitioning looked with misgiving upon the entry of the United States into an area which they regarded as their chosen field for exploitation. It was only natural that they should regard the United States as an intruder into a part of the world which they had selected to push forward their imperial designs.

The capture of Manila was resented by Germany and France. The actions of the German fleet under Admiral von Diederichs and the attitude of the French made it look as though serious complications would likely have resulted had it not been for the friendliness of the British Admiral. Undoubtedly the cause underlying this British sympathy was the fact that at that time she was faced by a combination of nations consisting of Germany, France, and Russia with

only Japan as a prospective ally. It is no wonder that, under these circumstances, she regarded the advent of the United States in the Far East as an opportunity to gain a needed ally.

One of the excuses often given for the occupation of the Philippine Islands was that the Dingley tariff was beginning to face retaliation abroad. It is probable that McKinley looked upon these islands as an excellent base from which the United States could uphold its established trading privileges in China and at the same time expand this trade. This conclusion is justified by the subsequent action of John Hay in announcing the open door policy which had previously been advocated by Great Britain. Another reason for their retention was the fear of the American and British governments that Germany was preparing to annex the archipelago if the United States withdrew. It was feared that such an action on the part of Germany would very likely provoke a world conflict. The acquisition of the islands under the conditions described and in the light of succeeding events have caused nations with colonies in the Far East to look with grave apprehension upon the possible consequences which are likely to take place if they are given complete independence. This would leave a relatively weak power in a very strategic position surrounded by ambitious neighbors.

When America took over the islands she had no experi-

ence in governing Oriental people. It was only natural that she would look for an example to the colonies of Great Britain and Holland. Entirely different conditions were to be faced in the Philippines than in the British and Dutch colonies. They had built a system of government upon the advanced rule of native rajahs and princes. In the Philippines very little tribal organization existed and the native system of ruling had been abolished for over two hundred years. The inhabitants, except for a relatively small Moro population, were almost all Christians. There is no doubt that their advancement previous to the American occupation has been responsible in a large degree for the wonderful progress made under American rule.¹

Great Britain, Holland, and the United States stand for peace in the Orient and wish to maintain the status quo in that part of the world. Any change is likely to have an adverse effect on the governing and trade of their colonies and perhaps on their relations with China and Japan. If the islands are given their independence there will no doubt be much anti-European agitation in the British, French, and Dutch colonies.² This is the reason they are gravely concerned over any change in policy of the United States.

¹ Maximo M. Kalaw, "The New Philippine Government," in American Political Science Review, Vol. 13 (August, 1919), p. 415.

² Roosevelt, "Philippine Independence and Peace in the Pacific," in Foreign Affairs Magazine, Vol. 8, pp. 409-415.

Most nations were openly distrustful of American participation in the affairs of the Orient. The British government was pleased with the decision of the United States to retain the Philippines. The Dutch and Australians feel that the islands serve as a buffer between them and Japan so long as they are protected by a strong naval power. The Japanese government is evidently worried over the interest of the United States in oriental affairs and especially over her attitude toward their Manchurian and Siberian policies.³ No doubt this fear is greatly heightened since the Washington government has refused to recognize the newly established state in Manchuria which has been brought about by the use of Japanese military force.

The British realize that, with the United States out of the Philippines, they must bear the brunt of keeping the status quo in the Far East. If and when America leaves they will no doubt enlarge their navy. Australia and New Zealand will be forced to depend to a greater extent upon the sea power of the mother country as a means of defense against the land-hungry people of Asia.⁴ It is little wonder that these two British possessions wish America to retain the islands. Great Britain is preparing the Singapore naval base in anticipation of the withdrawal of the United

³ Harrison, The Corner-stone of Philippine Independence, p. 308.

⁴ Roosevelt, loc. cit., p. 415.

States. She is counting on the aid of the Australian and Indian fleets. India is at the present time building a navy outside of the Washington Limitation of Arms Agreement. The British wish to retain their Asiatic trade in the face of an expanding Japan. It is unlikely that Great Britain will ever allow Japan to get control of this group of islands regardless of what the United States does with them. The British government has been granting subsidies to the great Jamshedpur Steel Works being constructed in India.⁵ The stakes are too great for her to permit her rival in the Far East to get control of a base of such strategic importance.

If the Filipinos are granted independence, it appears very likely that there will be a shifting of the balance of power in the Far East. In this new realignment the United States will have little influence as it is unlikely that any nation could be induced to believe that she would use force in any Far Eastern question after she has given up control of the Philippines.⁶ Many important problems are bound to arise in that area which will be of very great importance to the entire world. What will the policy of Great Britain, Japan, China, Russia, and Holland be? All of these nations have vast interests in Asia and the Pacific, and they will

⁵ George B. Nea, "The Keys of Empire," in Far East Review, Vol. 23 (February, 1927), pp. 51-53.

⁶ "Hoover and Manila," in The Living Age, Vol. 339 (October, 1930), p. 135.

be deeply concerned with every new arrangement made in that section of the world. What will the new realignment be? What effect will it have on the possessions of these nations? How will it affect their trade?⁷ Time alone can answer these questions which are no doubt causing the world statesmen considerable anxiety.

Arthur Brook of the New York Times interpreted the House bill of 1930 proposing independence to the islands on July 4, 1940, as a terrible upset of the status quo in the Pacific. He says:

With the Dutch East Indies troubled, with India seething, with China broken by civil war and invasion, with Japan consolidating her own Monroe Doctrine on the Chinese mainland, a notice from the House that the United States is ready to remove its stabilizing influences for the white man's stake in the Orient is tantamount to every author of disorder. It withdraws, in their opinion, the base on which the London treaties of 1930 were laid.⁸

It is doubtless true that the British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese, all of whom have valuable possessions near the islands, would not interfere with an independent Philippine nation unless forced to do so. It is the liberal treatment accorded the natives which they regard with impatience and disapproval. The generous methods used in permitting the Filipinos to have a very large degree of self

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ "The Filipino Freedom Bombshell," in Literary Digest, Vol. 113 (April 16, 1930), p. 9.

government is causing their colonies to ask for similar privileges.⁹ The idea of liberal treatment of colonies is seldom favorably received by nations holding distant possessions largely for the purpose of exploitation. This seems to be the motive for the presence of most of the European nations in the Far East. Japan in Korea, France in Indo-China, the Dutch in the East Indies, and the British in Malaya give the people only a trifling voice in government affairs.¹⁰ This is entirely different in the Philippines where the natives are in control of the major part of their government. It is true that they are far more advanced than the people of the European colonies. Regardless of this fact, if the Filipinos are given their freedom, it will no doubt stir up national feeling among these subject races and make their control much more difficult.

Captain Alfred T. Mahan gave position, strength, and resources as the three necessary essentials for a strategic point at sea for the protection of American trade. The Philippine Islands possess all three. They are located in a position to control the channel connecting the East China Sea and European trade. Their many straits and passages would make it difficult to blockade them even with a superior navy. They would serve as a wonderful base for Ameri-

⁹ Dutcher, The Political Awakening of the Far East, pp. 278-285.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 290.

can cruisers should it become desirable to prey on the commerce of an enemy trading with the East Indies. They are about half way between Singapore and Hongkong which would permit the United States to cooperate with Great Britain, her natural ally in the Far East, should she ever wish to do so.¹¹ The importance of their location is one of the reasons why Britain will never consent to allow them to become a possession of any nation likely to be unsympathetic toward her in the Pacific.

India is the center of Great Britain's world empire and the cornerstone of her prestige in Asia. She serves as a half way house between the British Isles and Australia, New Zealand, Hongkong, and Singapore. Before the World War, Gibraltar served as a base between her greatest rival for supremacy of the sea, Germany, and her vast empire in Asia and the Pacific. That source of danger is now past at least for some years to come, and she now regards Japan with suspicion. Immediately following the World War she began to construct an impregnable naval base at Singapore as a western point of defense for this same empire.¹² It is evident that she does not distrust the motives of the United States in the Orient or she would never have been willing to grant

¹¹ Truxtun Beale, "Strategical Value of the Philippines," in North American Review, Vol. 166 (June, 1898), p. 760.

¹² "The Pacific Rat Trap," in Far East Review, Vol. 19 (July, 1923), pp. 436-440.

her parity on the sea. Apparently she regards the rapid building of the Japanese fleet as a threat at her possessions and trade in that section of the world. If this is the case, and it appears to be the only logical conclusion which can be drawn from events which have transpired, undoubtedly she looks upon the United States as her natural ally in that quarter so long as America retains the Philippines. Such being the case, these islands must be regarded as holding a very important strategic position in the balance of power in the Pacific. They are looked upon as the buffer between the white and the yellow races.

Harrison, while Governor General of the Philippine Islands, told Lord Frederick J. M. T. Chelmsford, Viceroy of India, of the embarrassment of his country in having the islands on her hands at the end of the Spanish-American War. "Well," Chelmsford replied, "if that has embarrassed your country, you have no idea how your Philippine policy has embarrassed us!"¹³ America's altruistic methods of educating the natives and allowing them a large degree of self government together with her changing policies are causing other nations to be greatly concerned. They would like to see some definite stand taken in regard to the future status of the archipelago.¹⁴ This would give them a basis up-

¹³ Harrison, op. cit., p. 321.

¹⁴ Batchelder, "Philippine Independence," in Foreign Affairs Magazine, Vol. 2, p. 488.

on which to base their foreign policies. The price paid for the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was an Anglo-American entente for the defense of mutual interests in the Pacific. Many European and Japanese statesmen claim withdrawal from the islands will abrogate the four-power treaty, since it is based upon the maintenance of the status quo in the Pacific. Japan believes that the United States, Great Britain, and Russia are rapidly pushing her into a corner and attempting to thwart every move she makes to expand.¹⁵ The naval treaty between the Pacific powers contains a pledge not to strengthen or enlarge existing fortifications in the Pacific. Hawaii, Japan proper, and Singapore are not included in this agreement.¹⁶

Another angle of the Philippine problem resented by Japan is the tariff system, which has directed the greater part of Philippine trade to America and shuts out Japanese trade. At the same time the United States insists on the open door in China and Manchuria. The Japanese cannot see the justice of demanding equal commercial privileges with other Asiatics and at the same time denying her the same rights with another group.¹⁷ Apparently they do not consider the fact that they are doing the same thing in the case

¹⁵ "The Pacific Rat Trap," *loc. cit.*, pp. 436-439.

¹⁶ *Statutes at Large*, Vol. 43, p. 1663.

¹⁷ Blount, "Philippine Independence. When?," in *North American Review*, Vol. 184, p. 374.

of Korea. Here again, it is evident that self interest is the most important factor in molding Japanese opinion the same as in other nations. Great Britain has the same grievance. She points to India being left open to American trade while coastwise shipping laws and tariff policies make competition difficult in the Philippines.¹⁸ However, she does not show any active resentment over the exclusion of her commerce. It is likely that she believes the stabilizing influence of the United States in the Far East is of far greater value to her than any advantage she could possibly gain from trade with these American possessions.

The greatest losses to America arising from freeing the Philippines would be disrespect for American prestige in the Far East, loss of trade, and the loss of American ideals and missionary influence in the Orient.¹⁹ To offset these losses would be the fact that she would no longer be responsible for the protection of a people thousands of miles away from home. It would also relieve her of what is unquestionably the weakest link in her whole defense system.

Why should Japan wish to acquire possession of this island group? This is a question often times asked. The answer is that with these in her possession, she would hold the key to the trade routes to southern China. Today she

¹⁸ Dutcher, op. cit., p. 252.

¹⁹ Roosevelt, loc. cit., p. 413.

holds a chain of islands extending from Sakhalin Island on the north to Formosa at the south. If she were to own the Philippines she would have possession of an island chain which could easily be used to control the entire eastern coast of Asia. All of the world's commercial nations have misgivings about the hegemony of Japan in the Far East. The United States supported by many of the leaders in the British Isles, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were alarmed at her growing power supported by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This was the real incentive for the calling of the Washington Conference in 1921.²⁰ The anxiety of the British dominions would no doubt become more manifest if the United States steps out of the field of imperialism in the Orient. Every increase in the Japanese navy would unquestionably be construed as a direct threat to the British Empire and a challenge to her supremacy on the sea.

A contest of this nature has in the past invariably led to war and there is no cause to believe that a race for naval supremacy between these two nations would not be terminated in a gigantic naval battle. Just what a naval war between these two powers would mean to the world is hard to determine. What nations would ultimately be involved? Can the United States afford to see Japan control the Pacific? In what way would such a conflict affect her? These are

²⁰ David E. Owen, Imperialism in the Far East (New York c. 1929), pp. 90-120.

questions of very grave concern to a nation whose past experience with blockades have been far from satisfactory. Judging from the Napoleonic Wars and the recent world conflict, the answer would be that American trade would be molested. Past experience has shown that her neutrality could not be maintained in the face of continued interference with her commerce, which would be a constant source of irritation endangering the lives and property of neutrals. Under these circumstances any hasty action on the part of the United States in granting independence to the Filipinos appears to be a dangerous proceeding, which might easily lead to another war into which she could be drawn without much difficulty.

Japan is regarded in diplomatic circles as the "Germany of the East." Francis B. Harrison asks these questions: "Do we wish her to annex Manchuria and Siberia? Are we or the world ready to meet her thrust as we met Germany?" Japanese believe the law of existence drives them on. They feel that with their country it is either "grow or die."²¹ Apparently before any change is made in the status of the Philippines it would be well for the native leaders and the American government to take into consideration all the circumstances before taking a step which might sow the seeds of another devastating war.

²¹ Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

Control of world trade is an important factor in the desire of Japan to acquire possessions in the East Indies. The prize of Malaysian rubber is a reward well worth controlling. A large per cent of the world supply is raised in this area. Japanese business men have long regarded the Philippines as a fertile field in which to engage in the rubber business. Should she control this archipelago, it would threaten the British control of the East India rubber supply besides endangering her trade route to China.²² Here again is another cause for Great Britain and Holland to be deeply concerned over the indecision of the United States regarding the future status of the islands.

The prospect of early independence may be adversely affected by the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria. It seems that prudence should dictate that the United States should retain some measure of control until conditions in the Far East are more settled. However, it appears from the recent action of congress that they will be only too willing to get rid of them and avoid the responsibility for their safety. Where Franklin D. Roosevelt will stand on the granting of complete separation is a question which many of the world statesmen are undoubtedly impatiently waiting to have answered.

There are many problems which an independent Philippine

²² "The Pacific Rat Trap," loc. cit., p. 437.

nation would be forced to face. The more important of these are international security, imperialism, militarism, extra territoriality, mass immigration, and economic penetration.²³ Of these, international security and militarism are closely connected because the former may mean that they will find it necessary to keep a large standing army in order to ward off the attacks of foreign nations.

If separation is ultimately brought about, mass immigration and economic penetration may be serious factors the Filipinos must face. Other Asiatics have been excluded from the islands by the American immigration laws. These laws have set a dangerous precedent which can probably never last long after the withdrawal of the United States. The inhabitants are a Malay people with in many cases a mixture of Chinese and Japanese blood. A discrimination against racial brothers is certain to cause resentment and retaliation. The future peace and prosperity of an independent Philippine nation must necessarily depend upon friendly relations with their neighbors. It is unlikely that either China or Japan will enter treaty relations with a small Asiatic country which discriminates against their people.²⁴ Wages are about twice as high as in China and it is alleged that this will draw thousands of Mongolians and the result for the Filipi-

²³ Vincente Villamin, "Independence. Its Obligations," in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 131 (May, 1927), p. 19.

²⁴ George B. Rea, "Altruism versus Horse Sense in the Philippines," in Far East Review, Vol. 22 (October, 1926), pp. 449-450.

nos, who cannot hope to compete on even terms with the newcomers, will be the fate of the people of Hawaii, the Strait Settlements, or Java.²⁵ However, the people who advance this argument fail to take into consideration the greater efficiency of the natives which may prove of enough value to offset this difference.

The recent action of congress in overriding the Hoover veto of the independence bill will now give the natives an opportunity to vote on the question of whether or not they wish to become a separate nation, to face the difficulties and reap the rewards which will come to them as free country. In the interest of everyone concerned it is to be hoped that the final decision will bring peace and prosperity to the Filipinos.

²⁵ Garfield O. Jones, "Filipino Politicians and Independence," in The Outlook, Vol. 105 (September 20, 1913), pp. 132-136.

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